

COMMENTARY

Gender and women's studies in Turkey: A moment for reflection?

Deniz Kandiyoti

On 13 March 2010, a meeting hosted by Koç University, launching its new Gender Studies Center, brought together representatives of women's and gender studies centers in Turkish universities, in order to take stock of their progress and problems and to generate an agenda for future collaboration. These centers, and the diverse graduate programs they host, have, by and large, been created through the commitment and efforts of feminists in academia who have waged bureaucratic battles for recognition and space within their institutions.

At one level, judging by the number of centers and programs and their geographical reach beyond the pioneering establishments in Ankara and İstanbul, one may be tempted to conclude that this has been an unqualified success story. However, the deliberations of the meeting highlighted areas of great concern, if not outright anxiety. Do these centers have adequate links with women's civil society organizations? What are their relations with the women's movement in Turkey, however defined? To what extent do the analytic perspectives they have adopted in their pedagogical and research work inform the spheres of policy and practice? Do they have any purchase on the public policy agenda? How effective have they been in the area of women's rights advocacy? How proactive have they been in working with public-sector and governmental bodies (such as the Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality) to press for a common agenda? On these questions, the mood was one of despondency. Many accounts of engagement with the legal system and with policy-makers pointed to moments of partial success, followed by backsliding and hard-won concessions being clawed back.¹

Deniz Kandiyoti, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, dk1@soas.ac.uk.

¹ The most graphic example was the battle over forced virginity tests, which had led to girls' suicides in

New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 43 (2010): 165-176.

Why, I wonder, were these institutional histories never fully documented and reflected upon?² This is no idle question given the fact that feminist movements all over the world have been engaged in searching processes of self-reflection. The products of these processes made their way into mainstream literature through important works, such as Sonia Alvarez's *Engendering Democracy* which, although grounded in the specific experiences of women's movements in Latin America, has much broader relevance in terms of the questions posed.³ What is the result of the encounter between local feminist movements and the global "gender equality regime"?⁴ How are governments implicated in these encounters? Does the "NGOization" of women's movements—and their dealings with both governmental bodies and international donors—create a new "technocracy"? And with what effects? How does "academic feminism" insert itself into these circuits of funding and activism? These questions have as much resonance in Turkey as elsewhere, since it has a long history of engagement with global governance and funding institutions. Yet, their discussion is muted, if not totally submerged, by the continuing polemics around the nature of the Kemalist legacy and the exhausted paradigms of secularism *versus* Islamism, modernities, and alternative modernities. It may be argued that academic perspectives on gender and women in Turkey have reached something of a *cul-de-sac*, to the extent that we are yet to do full justice to the complex institutional and ideological landscape, both international and national, that frames and inflects such discourses.

Gender and women's studies in Turkey, as elsewhere, are the product of the confluence of at least three temporally distinct, but mutually reinforcing sets of influences: women's movements; the epistemological/analytic challenges of feminism to academia; and the global "institutionalization" of standards and mechanisms for gender equality through the workings of the United Nations (UN) system and major international

the early 1990s. See Ayşe Parla, "The 'Honor' of the State: Virginity Examinations in Turkey," *Feminist Studies* 7, no. 1 (2001). Feminist groups campaigned for the complete removal of virginity tests from the Criminal Code; however the new Criminal Code of 2004 still allows virginity tests if ordered by a judge or prosecutor.

2 This is not to suggest that excellent accounts of the women's movement in Turkey are absent. On the contrary, Yeşim Arat, Şirin Tekeli, Nükhet Sirman and many others have provided very thoughtful accounts. However, these are by and large thematic rather than institutional accounts highlighting key issues, players, and tendencies. See for instance the articles in Şirin Tekeli, ed. *Women Studies in Turkey: A Reader* (London: Zed, 1994).

3 Sonia Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy. Women's Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

4 Here I borrow a term used in Nükhet Kardam, *Turkey's Engagement with Global Women's Human Rights* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

donors. These influences always interact and intersect in quite specific ways in each national context, mapping out the parameters of what I call the *politics of gender*—namely, processes of appropriation, contestation and reinterpretation of positions on gender relations and women's rights by state, non-state, and global actors.

We must first recognize that the manner of entry of feminist scholarship into academia has followed very different trajectories in the North and the global South. The development of feminist scholarship since the 1960s corresponded to the “second wave” of feminist activism in the United States and Europe and eventually led to the establishment of the field of women's studies (much in the way that the civil rights movement in the United States prompted the creation of black studies).

A rough periodization of these developments points to three phases: first, an epistemological onslaught on the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences (and eventually science itself), revealing their androcentric bias; second, a phase of grand theories accounting for the subordination of women (with liberal, radical, and socialist feminist orientations); and, finally, a post-colonial and post-structuralist critique that not only problematized the concept of “woman” as a universal subject, but also introduced “gender” as a relational term encompassing women as well as any social construction having to do with the male/female distinction.⁵ To the extent that the twists and turns of feminist theory in the West established the “canons” of the discipline, they had a global reach influencing women's and gender studies programs around the world. This, however, does not detract from the fact that the trajectory of women's studies elsewhere—and I shall concentrate here on the Middle East and Turkey—was quite different.

We must first note that the early stirrings of feminism were located in the movements for social reform and modernization between the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth century and that nationalism was the leading idiom through which issues pertaining to women's position in society were articulated. In this respect, there are striking thematic similarities between Turkey, Iran, and Egypt.⁶ I have argued elsewhere that there have been persistent tensions between modernist trends in nationalism, favoring an expansion of women's citizenship

5 For a more detailed overview, see Deniz Kandiyoti, “Contemporary Feminist Scholarship and Middle East Studies,” in *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

6 These reform movements have received numerous evaluations in the context of critiques of modernity. These critiques have, in turn, unwittingly limited the discursive field to interactions with the West. See “Introduction,” in *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, eds. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002).

rights and social equality, and the organicist, anti-modernist strands that were concerned about the dilution and contamination of cultural values and identity in post-colonial (and in the case of Turkey and Iran, post-dynastic) contexts.⁷ Debates about Islam and its compatibility with women's emancipation (harking back to the writings of Qasim Amin) were inserted into these broader discussions. These were temporarily eclipsed by social science paradigms concerned with explaining development and underdevelopment. Whether under the influence of the modernization or Marxist paradigms, the "woman question" was subsumed into discourses about the transition from "tradition" or "feudalism." This briefly displaced Muslim exceptionalism with respect to women's status in favor of a focus on "development" as a key issue. The privileged focus on Islam returned with renewed vigor, however, after the Iranian revolution in 1979, reaching a climax in the geopolitical context of the post-September 11 "war on terror" (a point to which I shall return below).

As in many other countries, the story of women's studies in Turkey is inextricably linked to the moment when the issue of "women in development" (WID) was put on the global agenda at the first international UN conference on Women in Mexico City in 1975, a conference that prompted the growth of a new administrative and ideational infrastructure. A critique emanating from a group of Washington-based feminists and their colleagues in the South maintained that development, and development aid, was deepening gender inequalities rather than including women as equal partners. This made no development sense since high rates of female illiteracy, soaring birth rates and the low income-generation potential of women could only hamper national development. A dual process of documenting "gender gaps" worldwide and remedying them got under way. The instrumentalism of the WID agenda had a familiar ring: Had nationalist reformers not already pushed for "educated mothers" as the key to a healthy nation? The period of post-World War II developmentalism had also given rise to various "state feminisms." The idiom of national development was one to which many governments could readily subscribe, explaining their willingness to accommodate "national machineries" to monitor the advancement of women (in the form of women's divisions attached to ministries, free-standing directorates, or, in some cases, entire ministerial structures).

It is against the background of this new administrative and ideational infrastructure that women's studies (as distinct from women's movements

7 "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation," in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Laura Chisman and Patrick Williams (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).

that have a much longer history) started to take shape in Turkey in the 1970s. After the Mexico City conference in 1975, a meeting was held in İstanbul, resulting in one of the early collections on the status of women, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat.⁸ One of the best-established centers for women's studies was founded at the Middle East Technical University with UNDP support. For feminists in Turkey, it was clearly a question of seizing the moment and creating new spaces, both for greater visibility and for the creation of a new information base. The examination of legislation, of women's labor force participation, of their education and health status was in demand, not only by women's rights activists, but also by public bodies that needed to tender progress reports on Turkey to the relevant UN commissions. Thus, the expertise and labor of academic feminists was enlisted, and a process of sometimes quite difficult collaboration between women's rights activists and state bureaucracies commenced.

In many countries, there is an important debate concerning the results of the co-optation of feminists into bureaucratic structures and the appearance of so-called "femocrats."⁹ I do not believe that this was ever a significant issue in Turkey. Although Turkish women's rights advocates have held high-profile international positions, such as participating in the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Commission or acting as UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, their profile in political society has been consistently low.¹⁰ Nonetheless, the entanglements of women's rights advocates, both in academia and in an expanding range of civil society organizations, with the state on the one hand and the international donor community on the other has created a complex institutional landscape.

We must now fast-forward to another key date in the global calendar: the UN Beijing Conference on Women in 1995. If the 1975 conference in Mexico had been about foregrounding women as disadvantaged agents of development and the 1985 Nairobi conference about acknowledging the global North-South divides, Beijing signaled something else altogether. It represented the coming of age of the "gender agenda" in

8 Nermin Abadan-Unat, ed. *Women in Turkish Society* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981).

9 Hester Eisenstein, *Inside Agitators: Australian Femocrats and the State* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996); Louise Chapell and Lisa Hill, eds., *The Politics of Women's Interests*, (London: Routledge, 2006).

10 I am making a clear distinction here between women and women's rights activists. The record of women politicians regarding women's rights issues is extremely mixed. Women's representation and co-optation in political parties is an important but quite separate issue which goes well beyond the scope of this short commentary.

development and its official incorporation into development policy through gender mainstreaming. This signified a push towards systematic procedures and mechanisms for taking account of gender issues at all stages of policy-making and program design and implementation. If the turn to "gender" in academia was predominantly inspired by a post-structuralist critique, its dominance in the field of development was, in part, due to the misbehavior of earlier women-targeted projects and policies that had "ghettoized" women's issues in underfunded and marginalized units.

The academic turn to gender undoubtedly had some enabling features. It led to the inclusion of masculinities as an object of study (which also took off in Turkey) and immensely broadened the scope of arenas onto which a gender lens could be trained.¹¹ Any institutional domain, from the state to the street, could henceforth be subjected to critical scrutiny from a gender perspective. It may be worth reflecting further on whether this expansion in analytic reach has been achieved at the cost of political coherence, most notably in the field of development.

The shift to gender and development (GAD), although motivated by practical concerns, nonetheless needed to draw its concepts and tools from academia and inevitably reflected the state of play among social movements in the North. This had complex political and practical consequences.¹² In fact, Beijing also became the occasion for calling into question the conceptual foundation and subject-matter of the conference itself—the concept of gender with its implicit notions of injustice and, especially, of the mutability of gender relations.¹³ Feminist movements in the North had meanwhile incorporated sexual liberties platforms, although they remained deeply divided on the question of libertarianism. From the relatively tame "developmental" agenda of Mexico in 1975, we travelled to the arresting spectacle reported to have taken place at the Beijing Conference in 1995, when a phalanx of veiled women from Iran faced a demonstration of gay and lesbian women activists with the chant of "perverts, perverts." The issue of women's rights as human rights was

11 Significantly, this is rendered in Turkish as *kadın bakış açısı* (woman's standpoint), whereas gender is translated as *toplumsal cinsiyet*. This is worth reflecting upon. I do not believe that this choice is only due to the fact that "gender" has no real counterpart in the Turkish language (as in many other languages), but to an implicit attachment to the more radical epistemology of the first phase of feminism that treated women as an oppressed and marginalized group.

12 At the very least, this significantly raised the level of requirements for "gender literacy," because women activists not well versed in the tools of gender training and planning cannot readily participate in donor-funded project activities.

13 Sally Baden and Anne Marie Goetz, "Who Needs (Sex) When You Can Have (Gender)? Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing," in *Feminist Vision of Development*, eds. Cecile Jackson and Ruth Pearson (London: Routledge, 1998).

now cross-cut by sexual liberties platforms that included gays and transgender activists and a cultural politics claiming groups' rights based on alternative conceptions of personhood and dignity.

I would like to put forward the argument that the current global conjuncture is particularly inimical to women's rights advocacy and activism, due to the alignment of at least three separate factors: the depoliticization of women's rights platforms through co-optation by governments (most blatantly, in the case of repressive, non-democratic regimes); the deepening of global neo-liberal policies; and their effects on the rights agenda and the "instrumentalization" of women's rights in the post-September 11 geopolitical climate.

On the question of depoliticization, Pakistani feminist Nighat Khan, for instance, pointed to the example of an official celebration of the 8 March International Women's Day in 2000, with General Parwaz Musharraf as keynote speaker and government ministers and the diplomatic corps in attendance—a display that made a mockery of the women workers' strike in Chicago that lies at the origins of the celebration.¹⁴ Understanding the links between struggles for women's equality and the political contexts in which they are enacted is therefore paramount. Marina Ottaway has remarked in relation to the Middle East that compliance with some gender conditionalities (such as creating dedicated national machineries to monitor gender equality or increasing women's political representation) is a relatively soft option for authoritarian regimes of the single-party or dynastic varieties, in comparison to moving towards more genuine democratic representation and a social justice agenda.¹⁵ This may leave women's movements in the Middle East in the unenviable position of either playing along with repressive and corrupt governments in the service of a donor-driven gender mainstreaming agenda, or trying to find virtue in an Islamist opposition that offers little room for maneuver on the gender justice front.

Secondly, Gita Sen has quite correctly pointed out that movements for gender justice and social justice have been drifting apart since the ascendance of global neo-liberal policies.¹⁶ Conversely, many social movements with conservative agendas have taken up platforms for so-

14 Nighat Khan, "The Impact of Global Women's Movements on International Relations: Has It Happened?," in *Common Ground and Mutual Exclusion: Women's Movements and International Relations*, eds. Marianne Braig and Sonja Wolte (London: Zed Books, 2002).

15 Marina Ottaway, "The Limits of Women's Rights," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, eds. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

16 Gita Sen, "Neolib, Neocons and Gender Justice: Lessons from Global Negotiations," *Occasional paper 9* (UNRISD, 2005).

cial justice. This was certainly the case with the Catholic Church whose hierarchy is vehemently opposed to an equality agenda, but who understood the strategic importance of making common cause with Southern countries on economic inequality issues. This won friends for its crusade against reproductive rights and women's rights platforms. These efforts famously culminated in an alliance between the representatives of the Holy See and Islamic conservatives at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994, in order to resist the adoption of the ICPD Programme of Action. This transnational alliance aimed, above all, to establish the principle that matters relating to sexuality, to the control of female bodies, and to reproductive choice do not belong to the sphere of civic deliberation, public choice, or human rights; rather, they belong to the domain of morality as defined by doctrinal imperatives.

Another well-known adjunct of neo-liberal policies—apart from reducing the arena of human rights to market freedoms and individual rights—was the retreat of the state from many areas of social provision. The flow of funds through decentralized authorities and non-governmental organization (NGO) channels modified the institutional landscape substantially. The growth of a donor-funded NGO sector and its lack of downward accountability has been the subject of an extensive critique; this has also encompassed women's NGOs. There has been a major shift in donor thinking towards enlisting more "embedded" actors in the shape of faith-based organizations which are, more often than not, organized around religious institutions (such as churches and mosques) with a clear comparative advantage in working with and mobilizing local communities when the state wants to shift its focus from social welfare to charity through new forms of solidarity. The simplistic equation of donor funding with the imposition of a Western (and presumably secular) agenda also needs revisiting, not least in view of the diversity of international players and sources of funding (including states and international NGOs in the Muslim world).

Finally, and most importantly, the naked instrumentalism behind the invocation of abused women in Afghanistan (and later in Iraq) as a prelude and accompaniment to US military interventions in the aftermath of the September 11 events and the ensuing "war on terror" had the effect of equating feminism with imperialism. The interventions of Laura Bush and Cherie Blair on behalf of oppressed Muslim women, far from inspiring an unqualified response of international feminist solidarity, provoked sharp critical reactions from many feminists in the North. However, the presentation of these interventions as "cultural imperial-

ism" had the unfortunate side-effect of locking the women of Afghanistan into an essentialized concept of cultural indigeneity that hid from view the social and political effects of successive interventions establishing the ascendancy of Islamist parties backed by a variety of foreign patrons in the context of the Cold War.¹⁷ The foreign-policy response of the US to increasing Islamic radicalism has been to usher in a new conventional wisdom—exemplified by the position taken in *The Task Force Report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy*¹⁸—arguing that engagement with Islamists of "moderate" hue is the way forward to promoting democracy and human rights.¹⁹ One of the favored partners of this latest social engineering project is, not surprisingly, Turkey, which unlike its neighbors to the East boasts robust levels of economic growth and a multi-party democracy.

After what may appear a rather lengthy detour through a consideration of global trends, I come to the tentative conclusion that gender and women's studies in Turkey may, paradoxically, have been relatively inward-looking despite (or because of?) the fact that they have drawn upon the canons of Western academia. Analyzing issues pertaining to gender and women through the prism of the well-worn binaries of secularism *versus* Islam, democratization *versus* authoritarianism, and modernity *versus* (no longer tradition!) alternative modernity needlessly restricts our field of vision. These tropes leave out the institutional dynamics that render the politics of gender intelligible on a daily basis.

Let me clarify this contention by means of a vignette. On 18 July 2010, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a meeting with women's NGOs in the context of the "Democratic Initiative and National Unity and Brotherhood Project," also dubbed "the Kurdish Initiative" by the popular press. The very fact that women's NGOs constituted a target constituency in this exercise points to the institutional entanglements I have alluded to earlier. However, the PM on this occasion chose to interpellate the women present as mothers, telling them that "their voices would drown out the sounds of bullets," since no pain equals that of a woman whose son has fallen victim to war. It is important to note that some of the 80-odd attendees were members of NGOs with known

17 Deniz Kandiyoti, "Gender in Afghanistan: Pragmatic Activism," *Open Democracy* (2009), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/deniz-kandiyoti/gender-in-afghanistan-pragmatic-activism>.

18 See The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/taskforce_details.php?taskforce_id=10.

19 R. Scott Appleby, "Of Fundamentalisms, Secular and Otherwise," *Open Democracy* (2010), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rscott-appleby/of-fundamentalisms-secular-and-otherwise>.

feminist credentials (such as the Women's Association [KA-DER] and *Uçan Süpürge*, the women's news network). This helps to explain why a participant took issue with the PM for addressing women only as mothers, overlooking the fact that they are full-fledged economic, political, and juridical personae. It was at this point that the PM apparently interjected: "I do not believe in the equality of men and women. I believe in equal opportunities. Men and women are different and complementary (*mütemmim*)."²⁰ Turkey's signatory status to CEDAW notwithstanding, the PM had clearly nodded in the direction of the Islamic concept of *fitrat* as his point of reference. The reactions of the participants were widely reported in the press as "utter shock," "having the effect of a cold shower," "total astonishment," and "deep disappointment." The real question to ask here is why exactly this comment coming from a PM who had never made a secret of his conservative Islamic leanings caused so much consternation.

To understand this particular dynamic, one must go back to the early 2000s and to the first period of the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, a political moment when European Union (EU) accession and meeting the Copenhagen Criteria were high on the political agenda. This was a period of legal changes of unprecedented scope, arguably the most progressive legislation for women since the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s. The new Turkish Civil Code, passed in November 2001, abolished the supremacy of men in marriage, establishing full equality of men and women in the family (with respect to rights over the family abode, marital property, divorce, child custody, inheritance, and rights to work and travel). The changes to the Turkish Penal Code, passed in September 2004, were also extensive: New measures were put in place in order to prevent sentence reduction for "killings in the name of customary law" (or so-called honor killings), which are now defined as aggravated homicide; marital rape was criminalized; the article foreseeing a reduction or suspension of the sentence of rapists and abductors marrying their victims was abolished; sexual offences such as harassment in the workplace were criminalized; and in the regulation of sexual crimes the discrimination between virgins and non-virgins, married and unmarried women was abolished. This was the closest Turkey had ever come to full compliance, at least on paper, with CEDAW.

Needless to say, women's professional associations and women's NGOs played an important role in securing these outcomes. They were

20 "Kadınla Erkek Eşit Olamaz," *Vatan*, 20 July 2010, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/haber/kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz/318006/9/Siyaset>.

called upon to represent Turkey in international forums (including the EU) and to contribute to the drafting of key documents. It is therefore not some unreflexive secularist impulse, but previous successful episodes of collaboration with governmental bodies and international organizations—and what they considered as their hard-won rights—that makes the consternation felt by the women attending the meeting intelligible. Just as important to consider are the latent anxieties that the comment brought to the surface. How secure is state legislation guaranteeing women's equal inheritance, divorce, and child custody rights? Rumors of public figures flaunting multiple wives in breach of existing legislation give rise to concerns about how long it will take before these tendencies find full expression, and justification, in legislation.²¹ Turkish women—whatever their political persuasions—have a great deal to lose, and they know it. If we are to believe survey results, women identifying themselves as practicing Muslims do not appear to condone polygyny any more than their secular sisters.²² Under the veneer of debates about Islam, secularism, and democracy, could we be witnessing a moment of masculinist restoration,²³ a move that could have broad populist appeal among strata that do not subscribe to the heterosociality of public spaces, much less to the equality of women within them? An engagement with these complex issues requires, at the very least, a recognition of the fluid and conjunctural relations between different sets of political and institutional players. The field of gender and women's studies in Turkey must move boldly onto this terrain. I also believe that it will only fully come of age when it is capable of writing its own critical history with honesty and rigor.

References

- Abadan-Unat, Nermin, ed. *Women in Turkish Society*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981.
- Alvarez, Sonia. *Engendering Democracy. Women's Movements in Transition Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Appleby, R. Scott. "Of Fundamentalisms, Secular and Otherwise." *Open Democracy* (2010), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rscott-appleby/of-fundamentalisms-secular-and-otherwise>.

- 21 The practice of entering into multiple unions through the procedure of *imam nikahı* (religious marriages which are not registered officially) is not new. However, this practice was not made public since there is no legal sanction for it. Although there has been no legislative change in this respect polygyny has gained greater currency and social legitimacy as a religiously sanctioned practice.
- 22 Interestingly, the press reported, for instance, that the veiled customers of Tekbir Inc., a well-known Muslim apparel company, decided to boycott the premises when it became known that the owner had taken a second wife.
- 23 I am using the term "restoration" only to indicate that Republican reforms did roll back the rights men enjoyed under *şeriat* legislation and that reintroducing these rights as an article of faith would restore male privilege *de jure* rather than just *de facto*, as is currently the case.

- Baden, Sally, and Anne Marie Goetz. "Who Needs (Sex) When You Can Have (Gender)? Conflicting Discourses on Gender at Beijing." In *Feminist Vision of Development*, edited by Cecile Jackson and Ruth Pearson. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Chapell, Louise, and Lisa Hill, eds. *The Politics of Women's Interests*. London: Routledge, 2006.
- The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/taskforce_details.php?taskforce_id=10.
- Eisenstein, Hester. *Inside Agitators: Australian Femocrats and the State*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996.
- "Kadınla Erkek Eşit Olamaz." *Vatan*, 20 July 2010, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/haber/kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz/318006/9/Siyaset>.
- Kandiyoti, Deniz. "Contemporary Feminist Scholarship and Middle East Studies." In *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti, 1-29. London: I.B. Tauris, 1996.
- . "Gender in Afghanistan: Pragmatic Activism." *Open Democracy* (2009), <http://www.opendemocracy.net/deniz-kandiyoti/gender-in-afghanistan-pragmatic-activism>.
- . "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation." In *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*, edited by Laura Chisman and Patrick Williams. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
- . "Introduction." In *Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey*, edited by Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, 1-21. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002.
- Kardam, Nükhet. *Turkey's Engagement with Global Women's Human Rights*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
- Khan, Nighat. "The Impact of Global Women's Movements on International Relations: Has It Happened?" In *Common Ground and Mutual Exclusion: Women's Movements and International Relations*, edited by Marianne Braig and Sonja Wolte. London: Zed Books, 2002.
- Ottaway, Marina. "The Limits of Women's Rights." In *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, edited by Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
- Parla, Ayşe. "The 'Honor' of the State: Virginity Examinations in Turkey." *Feminist Studies* 7, no. 1 (2001): 65-88.
- Sen, Gita. "Neolib, Neocons and Gender Justice: Lessons from Global Negotiations." *Occasional paper 9*: UNRISD, 2005.
- Tekeli, Şirin, ed. *Women Studies in Turkey: A Reader*. London: Zed, 1994.